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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 17-2175
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GLENVERT GREEN,
Appellant
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 4-16-cr-00259)
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 1.2
January 18, 2018
______________
Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 10, 2018)
______________
OPINION*
______________
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge
Appellant Glenvert Green appeals the District Court’s ruling prohibiting the cross-

*

This disposition is not an Opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

examination of the victim at Green’s sentencing hearing. We will affirm.
I
In March of 2016, Green was incarcerated at United States Penitentiary
Allenwood in White Deer, Pennsylvania. On March 9, 2016, Green left his housing unit
but remained in the “sally port,” an area through which inmates enter and exit the unit.
Green waited until Senior Officer Jacqueline Showers, a federal Bureau of Prisons
correctional officer, entered the sally port to monitor the metal detector. Once Officer
Showers and Green were alone and standing within feet of one another, Green exposed
his penis and began to masturbate. While doing so, he made sexual remarks to the
officer. Officer Showers ordered him to stop, but Green refused and continued his
conduct until Officer Showers radioed for assistance.
On December 20, 2016, Green pled guilty to indecent exposure, pursuant to the
Assimilated Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, in violation of Pennsylvania law, 18 Pa. C.S. §
3127.
On May 11, 2017, the District Court sentenced Green to 21 months’
imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his current sentence. At the sentencing
hearing, Officer Showers elected to give a victim impact statement on the record.
Defense counsel sought to cross-examine her and the Government objected. After
hearing argument from both parties, the District Court found that the questions proffered
by Green’s counsel would not elicit relevant testimony and sustained the objection.
On appeal, Green argues that the Court’s ruling prohibiting the cross-examination
of Officer Showers after her victim impact statement violated the Confrontation Clause
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and Green’s due process rights. As a result, he asks us to vacate the judgment of
sentence and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review constitutional
claims de novo, except where, as here, the issues were not raised in the court below. In
these instances, we review such claims for plain error. Government of Virgin Islands v.
Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S.
258, 262 (2010)). “A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even
though it was not brought to the court’s attention.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Appellate
courts may correct unpreserved error only when (1) there is an “error,” (2) that is “plain,”
(3) that affects the complaining party’s “substantial rights,” and (4) that “seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 421
n.19 (1977)).
III
Pursuant to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), victims have “[t]he right to
be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea,
sentencing, or any parole proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4); see also Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(4)(B) (“Before imposing sentence, the court must address any victim of crime who
is present at sentencing and must permit the victim to be reasonably heard.”). “Under the
CVRA, courts may not limit victims to a written statement.” United States v. Vampire
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Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 197 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006). At the sentencing hearing, Officer
Showers elected to testify to the impact Green’s conduct had on her mental state, both at
home and in the workplace.
Green argues first that the Court’s ruling to prohibit the cross-examination of
Officer Showers violated the Confrontation Clause. He acknowledges, however, that the
law is settled that the Confrontation Clause does not apply in the sentencing context. See
United States v. Robinson, 482 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Both the Supreme Court
and this Court of Appeals have determined that the Confrontation Clause does not apply
in the sentencing context[.]”); United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 347 (3d Cir.
1992) (“The Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause does not apply to sentencing
hearings and reliable hearsay is generally admissible. . . .”); United States v. Kikumura,
918 F.2d 1084, 1099-1100 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the Confrontation Clause applies
at trial, not sentencing). Because Green did not have the right to confront Officer
Showers at his sentencing, the claim that he was deprived of the opportunity to do so
does not pose a viable ground for relief.
The assertion that Green’s due process rights were violated by the District Court’s
ruling to prohibit cross-examination is similarly unfounded. The Due Process Clause
requires that victim impact statements must have some “minimal indicium of reliability
beyond mere allegation” to be admissible at sentencing hearings. Robinson, 482 F.3d at
246 (quoting Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102); see also United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d
1541, 1547 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he introduction of evidence at sentencing is subject to [a]
due process standard of reliability.”) Green does not contend that Officer Showers’
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testimony was insufficiently reliable to be properly considered by the District Court in
imposing sentence. He instead asserts, without citation to legal authority, that his due
process rights entitled him to cross-examine the victim because she testified to the
circumstances of the offense. This assertion, however, is refuted by controlling law. See
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949) (holding that consideration of
information supplied by witnesses at sentencing who are not subject to cross-examination
did not violate Due Process Clause); U.S. ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302,
309 (3d Cir. 1966) (“It is undoubtedly true that the guarantee of the right of confrontation
and cross-examination does not apply to sentencing pursuant to a criminal conviction.”)
Accordingly, because Green is unable to show a violation of the Confrontation
Clause or his due process rights, we will affirm the sentence of the District Court.
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